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Abstract
In 1956, W.B. Gallie introduced his idea of essentially contested concepts. In my paper, 
I offer a novel interpretation of his theory and argue that his theory, thus interpreted, 
is correct. The key to my interpretation lies in a condition Gallie places on essentially 
contested concepts that other interpreters downplay or dismiss: that the use of an 
essentially contested concept must be derived “from an original exemplar whose 
authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept.” This reveals a 
similarity between Gallie’s views and the semantic externalist views of Hilary Putnam, 
and others, about natural kind terms like “water” and “tiger.” I argue that natural kind 
terms and terms for essentially contested concepts are two species of a single semantic 
genus. In the case of natural kind terms, a term refers to a natural kind, the exemplars 
are instances of that kind, and the relation between the exemplars and anything to 
which the term applies is co-membership of the kind. In the case of terms for essen-
tially contested concepts, a term refers to an historical tradition, the exemplar is a 
stage or temporal part of that tradition, and the relation between the exemplar and 
anything to which the term refers is being the heir of. This allows me to understand the 
contests that alerted Gallie to the phenomenon of essentially contested concepts as 
contests over the ownership of historical traditions.
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In 1956, W.B. Gallie introduced his theory of essentially contested concepts.1 
In this paper I aim to accomplish two things. The first is to suggest what 
I believe to be a new way of understanding Gallie’s theory. The second is to 
recommend this theory by extending and developing it. In a nutshell, I take 
Gallie’s theory to be this. There is a class of terms, including “Christianity” and 
“art” which feature prominently in Gallie’s paper, the reference of which is tied 
to some exemplary phenomenon, and which correctly refer to something just 
in case that thing has a certain relation, being the heir of, to that exemplary 
phenomenon. The exemplary phenomena and the things to which such terms 
correctly refer through their relation to these exemplary phenomena, consti-
tute historical traditions, which I take to be (though this is not necessary for 
the development of the theory) concrete, temporally extended particulars. The 
contests around which Gallie organizes his paper arise because people fight 
for ownership, as it were, of traditions that are important to them. Such con-
tests are endemic to traditions though not, strictly speaking, essential to them. 
(Thus, Gallie’s theory would have better been called, not a theory of essentially 
contested concepts, but a theory of terms for endemically contested entities. 
For the sake of continuity with the existing literature, I shall continue to speak 
of essentially contested concepts, or terms.) Readers familiar with the seman-
tic externalist theories of Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke will recognize that 
my account of essentially contested terms is very similar to their account of 
natural kind terms.2 In fact, I shall argue that natural kind terms and essen-
tially contested terms are two species of the same semantic genus.
As I mentioned, my interpretation of Gallie is novel. His work has been dis-
cussed almost wholly within the context of social and political philosophy. 
In the process, it has been viewed from the perspective of other ideas which, 
it is suggested, it resembles. Thus, relativism and incommensurability, fam-
ily resemblances, the Rawlsian distinction between concept and conception, 
reflective equilibrium, open concepts, and normativity have all been brought 
1 W.B. Gallie “Essentially Contested Concepts”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1956), 
167–98. This was reprinted, with minor changes, in W.B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical 
Understanding (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964). Page references in the text are to the 
reprinted version. 
2 See, for example, Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Mind, Language and Reality: 
Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and Saul Kripke, 
Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). If I am right in my inter-
pretation, Gallie deserves some historical credit since he presented his theory more than a 
decade before the development of similar ideas by Putnam and Kripke.
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in to illuminate Gallie’s idea.3 Correlatively with these theoretical perspec-
tives has been an emphasis on a certain range of examples. It is sometimes 
uncritically assumed that most of our social, political, and ethical concepts 
are cases of the phenomenon Gallie is concerned with, if anything is at all. My 
own approach to Gallie will involve re-assessing the range of examples of the 
phenomenon he is interested in.
1 Essentially Contested Concepts: The Theory
Let us begin by approaching Gallie’s target informally. Gallie is interested in 
concepts that are associated with a certain kind of contest or conflict in their 
use, function, or application. It is initially the character of these contests that 
sets apart the target concepts (or terms) and makes them of interest. These 
are contests that cannot be settled by rational means but in which rational 
considerations are not idle. People can be induced to switch sides in these con-
tests by the production of evidence or argument, even though such things will 
not be rationally compelling to everyone. This fact, for Gallie, seems to mean 
that the conflicts involved are not simply conflicts of value or preference. But 
the contests of interest are to be distinguished from another type of contest, 
as well. For they do not embody the kind of confusion that could be resolved 
by simply stipulating a definition and, if necessary, introducing new terms or 
concepts. Contestants, in other words, are not simply talking past each other. 
Straightforward conflicts over value and confused conflicts in which a resort to 
stipulation is useful are, of course, both frequently encountered. But Gallie’s 
interest is caught by the idea that there are contests that are neither; in these 
contests, as he puts it deliberately toying with paradox, we are dealing with 
3 Relativism and incommensurability: Steven Lukes, “Relativism: Cognitive and Moral”, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 48 (1974), 165–89; fam-
ily resemblances: Ernest Gellner, Selected Philosophical Themes, Volume II: Contemporary 
Thought and Politics (London: Routledge, 1974) and Peter Ingram, “Open Concepts and 
Contested Concepts”, Philosophia, 15 (1985), 41–59; concept and conception: Steven Lukes, 
Power: A Radical View, second edition (London: MacMillan, 2005) and Christine Swanton, 
“On the ‘Essential Contestedness’ of Political Concepts”, Ethics, 95 (1985), 811–27; reflective 
equilibrium: Swanton, “On the ‘Essential Contestedness’ of Political Concepts”; open con-
cepts: Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts”, Ethics, 84 
(1973), 1–9; normativity: Lukes, “Relativism: Cognitive and Moral”, Power: A Radical View, and 
John Gray “On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts”, Political Theory, 5 (1977), 
331–48.
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“concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about 
their proper uses on the part of their users” (158).
We are probably all familiar with examples of such conflicts. One person 
says something like: “Conservatism is really about not rushing into social 
change.” Another replies: “No, it’s about preserving the rights of the individual 
against government encroachment.” Philosophers hearing such disputes are, 
perhaps, often prone to want to resolve them into one or other of the kinds of 
dispute from which Gallie distinguishes his target phenomenon. On the one 
hand, we might think that the two speakers are simply interested in, and value, 
different things; worrying about what Conservatism is is just a red herring, the 
invocation of the concept nothing but a Shibboleth with which each partici-
pant seeks to sanction her own preferences. Alternatively, we may want to say 
that “Conservatism” is ambiguous; it has, indeed, been used to name both of 
these things; let “Conservatism*” name the first and “Conservatism+” name the 
second. Now there’s nothing to argue about. But if Conservatism is an example 
of an essentially contested concept, both these responses incorrectly identify 
the nature of the contest portrayed in my minimal dialogue.
What, then, is Gallie’s theory of essentially contested concepts? 
Unfortunately, it is hard to say precisely, owing to some confusions in his pre-
sentation, but it clearly has something to do with seven conditions that he 
lays out:4
(I) The concept must be appraisive in the sense that it signifies or accredits 
some kind of valued achievement.
(II) This achievement must be of an internally complex character, for all that 
its worth is attributed to it as a whole.
(III) Any explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to the 
respective contributions of its various parts or features . . . In fine, the 
accredited achievement is initially variously describable.
(IV) The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of consider-
able modification in the light of changing circumstances . . . I shall call 
the concept of any such achievement ‘open’ in character . . .
(V) . . . [E]ach party [must] recognize[] the fact that its own use of [the con-
cept] is contested by those of other parties . . . [It must be used] both 
aggressively and defensively.
4 The wording of the first five conditions is taken from 161, that of the last two from 168. All 
language not in square brackets is direct quotation; the rest is minimal paraphrase.
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(VI) [The concept, or the use of the concept, must be derived] from an orig-
inal exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant 
users of the concept.
(VII) [It must be probable, or plausible, that] the continuous competition 
for acknowledgment as between the contestant users of the concept 
enables the original exemplar’s achievement to be sustained or devel-
oped in optimum fashion.
Gallie begins by presenting the first five conditions together, says that each is 
necessary, and that (together) they “explain sufficiently what it means for a 
concept to count as essentially contested” (168). One naturally thinks, there-
fore, that the conjunction of the first five conditions is meant to be a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for something’s being an essentially contested 
concept. However, Gallie immediately goes on to say, apparently contradict-
ing his “sufficiently explain,” that conditions I–V “do not include any clear sug-
gestion . . . for distinguishing an essentially contested concept from a concept 
which can be shown . . . to be radically confused” (168). This latter task, he 
thinks, is somehow connected with conditions VI and VII. One might then sup-
pose that the conjunction of all seven conditions constitutes the claim about 
the nature of essentially contested concepts, but again, the waters are mud-
died by Gallie’s claim that conditions VI and VII are not conditions on what it 
is for something to be an essentially contested concept but conditions for the 
use of an essentially contested concept’s being, in some sense, justified. There 
is, therefore, no consistent position explicitly articulated over exactly what an 
essentially contested concept is. Some interpretation is required.
My interpretation of Gallie takes condition VI as central to the phenomenon 
in which he is interested.5 Although Gallie is himself confused about its status, 
an unbiased reading of his paper will surely confirm that it is of central impor-
tance to what he takes himself to be doing; hence, by neglecting this condition, 
one seriously risks missing his point altogether. Let us look at how condition VI 
works in an adaptation of one of the ‘live’ cases discussed at length by Gallie. 
5 It is precisely over this condition and its significance that my interpretation differs from all 
those described in the second paragraph of this paper, for they all either downplay it or reject 
or ignore it altogether. Gellner makes opposition to it central to his understanding of Gallie; 
I shall discuss Gellner’s views on this extensively in section 3. Gray and Lukes make no refer-
ence to it. Ingram breezily dismisses it (on the basis of a single unhappy alleged counter-
example which I will mention later) and takes it as a condition satisfied only by concepts that 
are not really in the target class. Swanton does see the importance of the condition but does 
not, I think, treat it adequately. 
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Consider the expression “Christianity.”6 This provides an excellent example 
of a term that initially exhibits the kind of contestedness that defies rational 
resolution but to which such discussion is not irrelevant. To focus only on the 
United States today, and to present matters in a highly simplified and sche-
matic (but I hope still intelligible) way, different groups of users of the term 
take it to apply to radically different values, actions, or people. Some see capi-
talism, self-reliance, personal responsibility, and punishment as representing 
the true essence of Christianity and hence those things properly describable 
as “Christian.” Others find that essence in charity, love, peace activism, forgive-
ness, and tolerance. Partisans of each view may be inclined to think that what 
the other party calls “Christianity” is not real Christianity. No doubt this oppo-
sition is overly simple, but no-one living in the US could fail to detect some 
contest over the term “Christianity” between what we might call the Christian 
Right and the Christian Left.7 Now, why think that this contest is not of one of 
the kinds from which Gallie’s target phenomenon is distinguished? Perhaps 
the parties to the contest are simply opposing their different values to each 
other and the question of which set of values is the essence of Christianity is 
just an irrelevance? Certainly, people with one set of the values in question will 
oppose them to those in the other set. Or why not think that the contest can be 
settled by showing that each of the parties is just using the term “Christianity” 
with a different sense and that once this is recognized, there is no real point 
of contention between them?8 The reason is clear. There is an historical 
6 I think there is some latitude in whether we take the analysis as focusing on the abstract 
noun “Christianity,” the general noun “Christian,” or the adjective “Christian,” on the assump-
tion that these terms are closely interdefinable. Mutatis mutandis for all other cases.
7 My claims are so schematic and over-simplified that to attempt to support them with a one 
or two quotations for each side would be so easily accomplished as to be almost worthless. 
An internet search of “Christian Right versus Christian Left” brings up a number of relevant 
sources, of which I reference just Clare Snyder-Hall, “Christian Right Calls Christian Left 
‘A Rising Power’,” Tikkun Daily (website), http://www.tikkun.org/tikkundaily/2011/03/14/ 
christian-right-calls-christian-left-a-rising-power/ (accessed Nov 18, 2013)(and the embedded 
lecture therein by Dr. Mark Smith).
8 Not surprisingly, those who ignore or downplay condition VI think that Gallie is wrong for 
supposing that these kinds of cases can be separated. Thus Gellner: “I suspect that no such 
general differential is available” (Selected Philosophical Themes, Volume II: Contemporary 
Thought and Politics, 97). And Gray (referring the point to Gellner): “it is not at all evident 
how we are to distinguish concepts which have an essentially contested character from con-
cepts which are simply radically confused, or general words whose uses conceal a diversity 
of distinguishable concepts from general words which really denote an essentially contested 
concept” (“On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts”, 337).
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phenomenon, what Gallie calls an exemplar, and each of the contesting parties 
claims for itself a certain relation to that historical phenomenon, a relation 
such that if it obtains in one case, it cannot obtain in the other. The natures 
of both the exemplar and the contested relation to it will be examined much 
more closely in the following section. But roughly and provisionally, we can 
identify the exemplar in this case as something that includes the Bible and the 
person and biography of Jesus Christ, and the relation as being the heir of.9 The 
reason that the contesting parties cannot simply choose new names and go 
on their own separate ways is that they are fighting over who gets to keep the 
family silver. There is a real, not illusory, contest between the two parties as to 
which represents the true continuation of an historical movement or tradition 
that includes, along with much else, the Bible and Jesus.
Before turning to a more thorough examination of the exemplar and the 
contested relation to it, I want to make a few remarks about the other con-
ditions Gallie lays down on essentially contested concepts. The first requires 
that an essentially contested concept be appraisive and that its use signify or 
accredit a valued achievement. The use of an essentially contested term may 
be appraisive in two related senses: it may accredit the achievement implicit 
in something’s having the right relation to the exemplar (to something’s being 
the true heir of the Bible and Jesus), and it may (perhaps usually will) accord a 
value (positive or negative) to the exemplar that is transferred to whatever the 
term can be applied to now through the relation that obtains between it and the 
exemplar. So, the Christian Right and the Christian Left, both positively valu-
ing the exemplar – something that includes both the Bible and Jesus Christ – 
may contest between themselves as to which of them really is its heir; while 
a Nieztschean third party, contemning the exemplar, may positively value, or 
disvalue less, whichever of these parties she judges has failed to achieve heir-
ship to the exemplar.
Condition II states that the “achievement must be of an internally complex 
character, for all that its worth is attributed to it as a whole.” Here I think Gallie 
refers to the exemplar in his use of the word “achievement.” Any concrete real-
ity is internally complex and this is especially so for the kinds of things Gallie 
is concerned with. Clearly the Bible and the person and life of Jesus Christ are 
internally complex – there are many books in the Bible, many different values 
seem to be recommended in it, many puzzling events involving Jesus, etc. This 
9 With respect to my characterization of the exemplar here, I repeat that this is rough, provi-
sional, and not exhaustive. There is certainly a lot more that should be included in anything 
more than the schematic version I am giving here. See the following section for some discus-
sion of the types of things that might be included.
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internal complexity is crucial to the existence of the kind of contest Gallie is 
interested in. For example (with the understanding again that my treatment of 
the case is overly simple and schematic), the Christian Right and the Christian 
Left may relate themselves to the exemplar on account of the values and por-
trayal of God emphasized, respectively, in the Old Testament and the New 
Testament. The exemplar, being internally complex, contains both these ele-
ments but the contesting parties prioritize them differently.
Condition V is where the notion of contest is brought in to the picture, so 
in some sense, it clearly plays a very important role. On my interpretation, 
although this condition will often be true of terms or concepts in the target 
class, it need not be. Nothing in the relation of heirship implies the existence 
of rival claimants; and even if there are rival claimants, it is not obvious that 
each must know of the others’ existence. Nonetheless, where an exemplar is 
rich in internal complexity, especially where it contains elements that are in 
tension with each other, under ordinary circumstances it is highly likely that 
groups will evolve that prioritize the elements of this internal complexity dif-
ferently and hence that a contest will emerge over which party is the real heir 
of the exemplar. (I prefer, therefore, to think of such contests as endemic to the 
phenomena under discussion rather than as essential to them.) And of course, 
it is the fact that this has happened in many salient cases, over art, Christianity, 
and others, that has brought the target concepts to our attention and forced on 
us a consideration of how they work. So for Gallie, condition V has something 
of the role of a reference fixer for the term “essentially contested concept”; it 
may not be a necessary truth that an essentially contested concept satisfies 
condition V, but given the way the concept of an essentially contested concept 
has been introduced, it is perhaps close to being a priori that an essentially 
contested concept satisfies condition V. Given that it was not until the 1970s 
that Kripke firmly established the distinction between necessity and a priority, 
and given that necessity and essence are often taken to be closely allied, Gallie 
might therefore be forgiven for thinking that the concepts he was interested in 
were indeed essentially contested rather than merely of a kind almost inevita-
bly to be contested.
Condition VII, recall, is that the very contestedness of the concept be seen 
by the contestants as contributing to the sustainment or optimal development 
of the phenomenon in question. Gallie may have been inspired by the liberal 
idea, propounded so forcefully in Mill’s On Liberty, that honest disagreement 
about things is good for everyone involved.10 (And this would explain why 
some commentators on Gallie take essentially contested concepts to be a 
10 Thanks to a referee for bringing this to my attention.
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distinctive feature of liberal societies, a position I reject below.) But Gallie’s 
Condition VII goes further than Mill and it seems to me that it can hold only in 
very exceptional circumstances. The problem is that recognition that a contest 
is necessary for the optimal development of some phenomenon would almost 
inevitably inject an element of pretense into the conflict itself. Contestants 
over the mantle of Christianity have happily burnt and tortured one another. 
But even less extreme manifestation of the conflict is hard to reconcile with 
the view that the contest is just the vigorous and healthy exercising of the 
exemplar’s destiny. Condition VII may have some plausibility in certain cases 
though. Gallie introduces the condition through his invented example of con-
flict over championship in a kind of sport, and he also discusses extensively the 
concept of art, itself not implausibly taken as involving a playful component. 
It may be that Gallie was led to generalize too broadly from the ludic character 
of these examples.
2 Essentially Contested Concepts and Natural Kind Terms
In order to further our understanding of the theory I am both defending and 
attributing to Gallie, we must now attend in more detail to the nature of the 
exemplars involved in essentially contested terms or concepts and the nature 
of the contested relation to them. I will approach this through a comparison 
with the semantic externalist theory of natural kind terms (such as “water” 
and “tiger”) that was developed in the 1960s and 70s by Hilary Putnam and Saul 
Kripke.11 My claim will be that natural kind terms and essentially contested 
terms are both species of a single semantic genus. As such, they share many 
interesting properties. According to semantic externalism about natural kind 
terms, such terms are typically introduced in connection with some concrete 
thing or things (samples of water, tigers) and through those things come to 
denote the kinds to which those things belong. In other words, the reference of 
natural kind terms is not determined by some descriptive content associated 
with them, something knowledge of which might count as knowing the mean-
ing of the term. Rather, for something to be properly described now as “water,” 
it must be of the same natural kind as paradigmatic samples of that substance 
in connection with which the term was originally introduced. Current uses 
of the term continue to be connected to the original sample (and therefore 
to refer to something of the nature, whatever it is, exhibited by the original 
11 Loci classici include Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” and Kripke, Naming and 
Necessity.
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sample) through the (causal) historical connections between the sample’s 
baptism and current usage. The resemblance between this account and the 
account I gave in the previous section of essentially contested terms should 
be clear. Both essentially contested terms and natural kind terms are, on the 
respective theories, correctly applied to something now if and only if it bears a 
certain kind of relation to samples or exemplars that have played an historical 
role in the use of the term. This is what qualifies them as belonging to a single 
semantic genus.
The subsumption of essentially contested terms under the same genus as 
natural kind terms is as important for what it implies about how essentially 
contested terms do not work as it is for what it implies about how they do work. 
Externalist theories of natural kind terms were introduced to replace descrip-
tivist theories that saw such terms as being associated with some descriptive 
content and applying to anything that fitted that description. My suggestion 
that essentially contested terms function in a similar way to natural kind terms 
likewise rejects the idea that their meanings are given by some descriptive con-
tent that might be offered as a definition. If they were treated descriptively, 
then the disagreements that caught Gallie’s attention would inevitably turn 
out to be either mere confusions, to be settled by stipulation and disambigua-
tion, or empirical differences about which description people have in fact asso-
ciated with a term. In neither case would they have the features that impressed 
Gallie in contests involving them.
Nonetheless, there are significant differences between natural kind terms 
and essentially contested terms over the nature of both the exemplars or sam-
ples and the required relation to them. In the case of natural kind terms, the 
exemplars are, obviously, natural; in the cases Gallie is interested in, they are 
cultural. But there is another, bigger difference lurking behind this one. Natural 
kind terms are typically names of kinds of natural objects or substances – 
water, tin, tigers, electrons. And the exemplars themselves are either objects 
of the relevant kind or quantities of the relevant substance. In the case of 
essentially contested terms, the exemplar is something like a stage of a tradi-
tion. The exemplar will therefore consist in anything that might be an element 
of a tradition: cultural objects (e.g. literary works, codes of law), institutions, 
ways of doing things, people and their actions and intentions, and people’s 
understandings of all of the above. (I don’t intend this list to be exhaustive.) 
With regard to Christianity, for the sake of simplicity, I mentioned, as compo-
nents of the exemplar, just the Bible and the person and biography of Jesus 
Christ. In fact, a lot more should be included: the apostles, early ecclesiasti-
cal institutions, interpretive and ritual practices, and so on. Given the internal 
complexity of an exemplar, moreover, in practice, any element of a tradition 
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may itself be picked out and treated synechdochally as an exemplar itself. This 
is the phenomenon Gallie refers to in his conditions II and III.
What, exactly, a tradition is, is itself a difficult and interesting ontological 
question. One way to think of a tradition, which I adopt here mostly for the 
sake convenience (though it does seem an independently plausible view of the 
ontology of traditions) is as a concrete, spatio-temporally extended individual 
of the kind embraced by such philosophers as David Lewis and Ted Sider.12 In 
that case, an exemplar, what I have characterized as a stage of a tradition, will 
be literally a temporal part of a tradition.13 Needless to say, the boundaries 
of the exemplary part, both temporally and spatially, may be vague. In some 
cases, the vagueness will matter for understanding essentially contested terms 
since a contest may be generated by different ways of drawing the boundaries. 
For example, the exemplar for Christianity, on my approach, will be an early 
temporal part of a spatio-temporal entity, which part indisputably contains 
the Bible and the person and biography of Jesus Christ, among other things. 
Does it also include the non-canonical gospels? Some claiming the mantle of 
Christianity today may base their claim largely on their relation to those books 
and their claim might be contested by others who think these extra-canonical 
books do not form part of the exemplar. But although some contests may be 
generated by vagueness over the extent of the exemplar, it is important to 
see that Gallie’s point is not dependent on such vagueness; it depends on the 
exemplar’s internal complexity. The Christian Right and the Christian Left may 
agree to include in the exemplar only canonical books of the Bible; but one 
party prioritizes the stories of the Flood and of Sodom and Gomorrah, the laws 
of Leviticus, and the nightmares of Revelations, while the other prioritizes the 
Sermon on the Mount and the meekness of the crucified Christ.
Essentially contested terms and natural kind terms both, then, apply to 
something now just in case it has a certain relation to an original sample or 
historical exemplar. But what, exactly, is the relation something must have 
to the original sample or exemplar if a given term is to apply to it correctly? 
12 David Lewis, “Survival and Identity”, Philosophical Papers, vol. I (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983) and Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of 
Persistence and Time (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).
13 See, for exposition of the idea of temporal parts and its associated ontology, the works 
by Lewis and Sider cited in the previous note. For reasons that should become apparent, 
my remarks here do not require one to view traditions in this way. Nor, if one does view 
them this way, does anything I say require that one take the correct theory of parthood for 
them to be the classical extensional mereology favored by Lewis. See Peter Simons Parts: 
A Study in Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) for an account of mereology, 
both the classical extensional and other varieties.
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In the case of natural kind terms, something is correctly referred to by a use of 
a term just in case it belongs to the same kind as the exemplar. So the opera-
tive relation is belonging to the same kind as. One might wonder why there are 
not “contests” over natural kind terms in the same way as there are over essen-
tially contested terms. After all, any set of exemplars will presumably belong 
to many different kinds. (This corresponds to the internal complexity of the 
exemplar in the case of essentially contested terms.) We may suppose that the 
exemplars of water, besides belonging to the kind H2O, all belonged to the kind 
clear, thirst-quenching liquid. Under certain circumstances the two kinds may 
fail to coincide. For example, Putnam’s thought experiment of Twin Earth is 
of a place indistinguishable from Earth (by, say, pre-modern standards) but 
where instead of H2O, the lakes and rivers are filled with some other clear, 
thirst-quenching liquid, XYZ. Twin water would therefore share with the exem-
plars associated with the term “water” membership in the kind clear, thirst-
quenching liquid but not membership in the kind H2O. Conversely, quantities 
of steam or ice would share with those exemplars membership in the kind H2O 
but not in the kind clear, thirst-quenching liquid. Could we here have a contest 
over the term “water” in which one party took the term to apply to Twin Water 
but not steam and ice, while another party took the term to apply to steam 
and ice but not Twin Water? Yes and no. Yes, in that there is some contest here 
that is, in a sense, structurally similar to the contests in the case of essentially 
contested terms. The structural similarity is that in both cases, the root of the 
contest lies in the transition from the concrete (an exemplar or set of samples) 
to the general (a kind). The concrete is rich; any concrete phenomenon has 
many, probably infinitely many, features to it. To determine a kind on its basis 
is effectively to pick out some finite number of these features and ignore the 
rest. But if the original concretum has infinitely many features, there will be 
infinitely many different kinds that can be resolved out of it. Semantic exter-
nalists generally avoid the appearance of a problem here by building in to 
their description of the semantic phenomenon with which they are concerned 
such a method of resolution. Putnam, for example, speaks of the necessity 
of something’s bearing the same liquid as relation to some designated exem-
plars to be water and more or less takes for granted that for something to be 
the same liquid as something, it is necessary and sufficient that it share the 
latter’s chemical composition.14 (This means that, according to Putnam, 
“water” does not correctly apply to Twin Water.) Something like deep structure, 
then, is tacitly assumed to underlie the operative relation. Science has played 
along, determining that there are indeed deep structures that determine what 
14 Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, 225 and passim.
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we call natural kinds. But there is no reason why there could not be a semantic 
phenomenon in which we introduce a term with reference to a set of samples 
and the principle only that the term refer to things that are of the same kind 
(however that is determined) as the members of that set. In that case, people 
might argue over whether Twin Water or ice are, or are not, of the same kind 
as the liquid, H2O samples. However, the scientific case is not quite like that of 
essentially contested terms because it is not clear that the contests just envis-
aged should not be diagnosed as in some sense confused, calling simply for a 
stipulative answer.15 Parties to such a dispute over a word introduced in con-
nection with some liquid H2O samples and with the principle that it apply 
to things of the same kind as the samples (where this is not understood, as it 
is implicitly by Putnam, to mean of the same deep-structure chemical kind) 
can simply agree that the term is ambiguous and resolve their differences by 
disambiguating.
Turning to essentially contested terms, I have put the relation involved in 
terms of being the heir of. The exemplar is a stage (perhaps a temporal part) of 
a tradition; a given term now serves to pick out something that has the relation 
of being the heir of that tradition-stage. Although we will see in due course 
that this is not sufficient to capture the notion of heirship, a component of 
that relation is the relation being part of the same tradition as. A necessary con-
dition of one part of a tradition’s being the heir of another is that both are 
parts of a single tradition. I have already said that, for convenience, I will take 
a tradition to be a temporally extended concrete individual. Suppose, also for 
the sake of convenience, we think of a natural kind, like water or the species 
tiger, as a concrete individual of which individual tigers or samples of water 
are, literally, parts.16 Then, in both the cases of essentially contested terms and 
15 Two-dimensionalist semantics might perhaps be seen as an attempt to reconcile two such 
contesting parties. One thinks that Twin Water is of the same kind as the H2O samples, 
and appeals to certain semantic intuitions (involving claims of necessity, etc.) to support 
the case. The other thinks Twin Water is not of the same kind, and appeals to a different 
range of semantic intuitions (involving claims of a priority, etc.). The two-dimensionalist 
argues that the term satisfies both these sets of intuitions in virtue of different semantic 
features it has. For a brief overview of two-dimensionalism, see my “Modal Epistemology: 
Our Knowledge of Necessity and Possibility”, Philosophy Compass, 3 (2008), 664–684. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1747–9991.2008.00147.x
16 This is, in my opinion, a very implausible view (even if one detaches it from classical 
extensional mereology as the theory of parthood) for a variety of reasons, and I mention 
it here only to help make a point that is independent of it. It is not, however, a view 
that no-one has advocated. See David Hull “Are Species Really Individuals?”, Systematic 
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natural kind terms, it is necessary for something to be correctly described by 
such a term that it bear to the exemplar what David Lewis calls the I-relation, 
the relation one thing has to another when both are parts of some single thing.17 
For something now to be correctly described as Christianity, there must be an 
individual tradition of which the exemplary stage and the currently described 
phenomenon are both, literally, parts. And for something now to be a tiger, 
there must be an individual species of which the object now described and 
sample tigers are all, literally, parts. On our assumptions about the ontologies 
of natural kinds and traditions, then, we can see that natural kind terms and 
essentially contested terms all work by means of exemplars and an I-relation. 
This characterizes the semantic genus of which both kinds of terms are variet-
ies. The reference to an exemplar, and the subsumption of things under a given 
term through their having the I-relation to that exemplar, makes all the terms 
in this semantic genus historical, genetic, or externalist.18
All of this has been predicated on some assumptions about the ontologies 
of natural kinds and traditions. If one wishes to drop these assumptions, the 
point of the preceding paragraph would have to be expressed in terms of a 
broader kind of relation of which the I-relation proper would be one variety. 
This broader relation would hold not just when two things were parts of a sin-
gle whole of a given kind, but when, for example, they were co-instances of a 
single property, co-members of a single species, etc. Exactly which variety of 
this broader kind of relation one needed to explain a given historical or genetic 
term would depend on one’s views about the ontology of the kinds of covering 
entities (traditions, species, substances) involved. I shall not pursue the details 
of this further.
The similarity between natural kind terms and essentially contested terms, 
however, goes only so far and we need now to see why. When David Lewis 
introduced the expression “I-relation,” it was in the context of a discussion of 
 
Zoology, 25 (1976), 174–191 for species and W. V. Quine Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1960) for substances.
17 Lewis, “Survival and Identity”. Since Lewis accepts classical mereology, it follows that any 
two things are I-related since any two things have a fusion of which they are parts. We 
had, therefore, better think of a family of I-relations, each tied to some covering concept. 
Thus there is a relation of being co-parts of an F, another of being co-parts of a G, and so 
on. The relevant covering concept will be clear from the context here.
18 We can also see that, at least in principle, there might be genetic or historical terms that 
rely on other kinds of relation to an exemplar. Indeed, if the relation were irreflexive, the 
exemplar itself would not even be correctly described by the term. 
118-140_JPH 8.1_f7_Evnine.indd   131 2/24/2014   4:53:11 PM
132 evnine
journal of the philosophy of history 8 (2014) 118–140
personal identity. He was responding to a thought experiment in which a per-
son in some way undergoes fission. Suppose a person, A, undergoes such fis-
sion, the results of which are two persons B and C. It seems that each of B and 
C might have an equal, and good, claim to being the same person as A. Each, 
we may suppose, has memories of A’s life, has A’s personality, etc. Yet they can-
not both be identical to A since that would imply they were identical to each 
other. Lewis resolves the problem by arguing that rather than seeing “A,” “B,” 
and “C” as names of persons, we take them as names of temporal parts of per-
sons, which in turn are seen as temporally extended entities. Since a single 
thing can be part of two non-identical wholes, his diagnosis is that there is one 
person that has A and B as parts (A and B are I-related) and another person 
that has A and C as parts (A and C are I-related), but none that has B and C as 
parts (B and C are not I-related). Thus A is actually, simultaneously, a temporal 
part of two different persons. These two persons overlap at A as two roads or 
rivers may overlap for a stretch and yet still be distinct.
On Lewis’s account, there is, and can be, no contest between B and C over 
which is part of the same person as the person of which A is a part. The rea-
son, as we have seen, is that such a contest presupposes, incorrectly (and, of 
course, assuming the possibility of the kind of fission in Lewis’s example), that 
A can be part of only one person. Analogously, if the Christian Right and the 
Christian Left were to argue over which was a part of the same tradition as 
that of which the exemplary stage of Christianity is a part, we should give the 
same answer. Such contest would be illusory. There is one tradition of which 
the original exemplar and today’s Christian Right are parts, and a different one 
of which the original exemplar and today’s Christian Left are parts. These two 
traditions overlap at the original exemplar (and no doubt at many other places 
too), which is itself a part of more than one tradition. But this solution is a 
metaphysical solution to a metaphysical problem. It leaves completely unre-
solved a different variety of contest. In the episode “Second Chances” of Star 
Trek: The Next Generation, Commander Riker suffers essentially the fate of fis-
sion envisaged in Lewis’s thought experiment (owing to a transporter malfunc-
tion). One question that might be asked, the one addressed by Lewis, is which 
of the two resulting Riker-stages is part of the same person as the pre-accident 
Riker-stage. (The answer, of course, is that there is no single person of which 
the pre-accident stage is a part and that both of the post-accident stages are 
co-parts of a person with the pre-accident stage.) But there is another ques-
tion the two Rikers grapple with, of more practical import: which of them gets 
to keep the original Riker’s trombone. And this, of course, is a synecdoche for 
the problem of which of the two resulting people gets to continue the life of 
the original, to work at his job, to access his bank account, etc. Which of them 
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inherits the life of the original?19 That contest, of course, is not touched by 
Lewis’s dissolution of the metaphysical problem which says that there were 
two Rikers all along who shared their early years. Here, then, is a contest over 
inheritance.
On the one hand, then, there is the I-relation, the relation of being a co-part 
of something (person or tradition) with the original exemplar (early temporal 
part of the person or tradition) which, as Lewis shows, does not really gener-
ate a contest since the original itself might be part of more than one person 
or tradition. On the other hand, there is a practical contest over who gets to 
inherit from the original: which of the two Rikers keeps the trombone, which 
of the two parties keeps the relics, the name, control of the institutional struc-
tures, which view is sanctioned by the weight of history, etc. But contests over 
inheritance turn on heirship. One inherits in virtue of being the rightful heir. 
And this, I suggest, is the contest involved in essentially contested concepts. 
Such contests are over who has the right to inherit, over which party is the 
rightful heir of the exemplar.20 Contests over heirship, of course, are lacking 
in the case of natural kinds, since these are not, or are only incidentally, com-
prised of things that themselves care about their relation to an exemplar. That 
is why contests over whether the word “water,” introduced in relation to thirst-
quenching liquid H2O samples, is rightfully extended to ice and steam (non-
liquid H2O) or to Twin Water (non-H2O thirst-quenching liquid) can be settled 
by stipulation and disambiguation if necessary.
Imagine two children arguing over who rightfully inherits their parents’ cow. 
The younger may point to the fact that the parent loved her best; the older may 
dispute that, or concede it but point to the practice of primogeniture among 
neighbors, and so on. In many cases, such disputes are played out against the 
background of a legal system that either provides the answer as to who is the 
19 Having written this, I chanced to review the episode for the first time in many years. It 
turns out that I have slightly mischaracterized the nature of the drama that unfolds. Nor 
do they argue over who gets to keep the trombone. It is undisputed by all that it ‘belongs’ 
to the one currently in possession of it, who, magnanimously, makes a ‘gift’ of it to the 
other. I leave my text unedited, however, since it merely makes explicit what is implicit in 
my use of scare quotes around “belong” and “gift.”
20 This accounts for the fact, prominent in Gallie’s discussions of examples, that the relevant 
contests are not typically over which party, say, is Christianity as such, but over which 
party is real (or in other contexts, the destined, or the true) Christianity. A competing 
party may be a kind of Christianity, but it is not the heir. Just so, the contest between 
the two Rikers is not over which is Riker. They both are. The question is: which is the 
real Riker. It is very helpful, in thinking through Gallie’s examples, to keep this kind of 
language of being the real, or the true, or the destined such-and-such in mind.
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rightful heir or empowers someone to make one of the parties the rightful heir 
by judging in her favor. But where disputes concern religious or political tradi-
tions, or artistic movements, there is no established, institutionalized method 
to determine which party is right. Thus disputes cannot be decisively settled 
except, under some circumstances, by suppression of the weaker party by the 
stronger. Outside of something that functions like a legal system, there simply 
is no determinate answer to which, of two conflicting parties, is the rightful 
heir of the earlier tradition part. This accounts for some of the characteristic 
features of the kinds of contest that Gallie identified. They cannot be settled by 
reason because there simply is no objective answer as to which party is right. 
But reason may play a role in such disputes since it may speak to many issues 
that shape the contest. It may, for example, be able to show that a feature of 
the exemplary tradition stage on the basis of which one of the disputants now 
claims to be the rightful heir of that earlier stage was, in fact, seen at the time 
as a minor element in the tradition.
One feature of the kinds of dispute in question which I have briefly alluded 
to above is very significant. Such arguments may well take the form of disputes 
that appear definitional. That is, the disputants take themselves to be arguing 
over the meaning of an expression such as “Christianity” or “Conservatism.” 
This is because one is naturally inclined to make points of resemblance to the 
exemplar appear to win the contest of heirship analytically. If Christianity were 
defined in terms of love, then the party that now emphasizes its resemblance 
to those aspects of the exemplar that stress the role of love would seem to win 
the contest. Hence, their opponents in the contest over heirship would dispute 
the definition of Christianity in terms of love. Thus arises the notable phenom-
enon of real disputes that mistakenly take the form of fruitless arguments over 
definition. And this, in turn, encourages the mistaken belief that Christianity 
is a concept, something that might be realized under a variety of historical 
circumstances (or on Twin Earth), rather than a concrete historical reality.21
21 I say here that something like Christianity is to be identified with a concrete historical 
entity, a tradition, rather than with a concept capable of realization under indefinitely 
many circumstances. But this does not imply that Christianity may not have arisen or 
existed under other circumstances than those under which it actually did arise and does 
exist. By way of analogy, consider my chair. This is clearly a concrete entity. But perhaps it, 
that very chair, might have been built earlier or later than it was, or in a different place, or 
by a different maker, or from different wood, or from leather and plastic rather than wood. 
Which of these do and which do not represent real possibilities for it, that chair, will 
depend on the details of one’s views about the identity of chairs (or artifacts in general). 
So too, it will depend on the details of one’s views about the identity of traditions whether 
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I have said that essentially contested terms are not, after all, terms for things 
that are essentially contested. But while such contests may not be essential, 
they are surely endemic to the kinds of entities in question because while fis-
sions of persons are (at least for the moment) merely science fiction, an anal-
ogous process is an almost inevitable fact confronting any human tradition. 
Even where secession or heresy never actually occur, their threat is a constant 
possibility for any tradition.22 And in fact, one would be hard put to find cases 
of historically significant traditions where such contest never reared its head. 
Sometimes, if the existing patrimony is not already large, there may be a split 
without much contest, since there is not much to contest over; and sometimes, 
a potential contest may be easily stifled because of an imbalance of force. But 
the potential for contest is endemic to, and a very deep fact about the nature 
of, human traditions.
3 Objections to Gallie
I would like now to consider two prominent objections that have been raised 
against Gallie’s theory of essentially contested concepts. Doing so will allow 
me, simultaneously, to vindicate Gallie and my interpretation of him, and 
to deepen our understanding of the phenomenon under discussion. Ernest 
Gellner objects to Gallie’s inclusion of condition VI – which condition, of 
course, is exactly what I take to be central to what Gallie is doing – in his 
account of what an essentially contested concept is on the grounds that it is 
“an application of the ‘genetic fallacy’ argument: the present functioning of 
a concept (as of an institution) is logically independent of its history.” Even 
though in some cases, such as Christianity, there is a belief in an exemplar, 
Gellner argues, “would the relationship of Christian churches and sects turn 
out to have been quite different, should historical research disprove the his-
toricity of Christ?” The inclusion of VI, “intolerably, makes the status of being 
‘essentially contested’ into a hostage of the past”.23 A first point to note is 
Gellner’s misconception over the nature of the exemplar involved. Gallie 
that very tradition, Christianity, might have arisen earlier or later, on Twin Earth, and so 
on. Nothing I say here bears, or is intended to bear, on that question.
22 I thus disagree with those authors, such as Gellner, Selected Philosophical Themes, Volume 
II: Contemporary Thought and Politics, 107–8 Gray, “On the Contestability of Social and 
Political Concepts”, 336–7 who claim that essentially contested concepts are somehow 
distinctive of Western liberal modernity.
23 Gellner, Selected Philosophical Themes, Volume II: Contemporary Thought and Politics, 94.
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clearly does not think that in a case like Christianity, the relevant exemplar is 
a single person.24 It is, as I have argued, rather a stage of a tradition that will 
include a wide variety of people, events, institutions, texts, and so on. Nor, I 
think, must the originality of the exemplar be absolute. It is not required, for 
a contest of the kind Gallie is interested in, that the exemplar that makes the 
contest genuine rather than illusory or confused be at the beginning of the 
tradition rightful ownership of which is being contested. When bifurcation in a 
tradition threatens, the actual distant past may figure into the struggle mostly 
insofar as the tradition itself has interpreted its past throughout its duration. 
So the existence of stories about Jesus Christ might, especially some years after 
the events related in those stories, play exactly the role that a real person might 
have played. Insofar as the actual history of the tradition has become lost to 
it, and so does not figure in the tradition’s own understanding of itself, it is 
irrelevant to understanding the kinds of contest that Gallie is concerned with. 
The effect of a rediscovery of an important historical aspect that has played 
no role in the development of the tradition may come to figure in current con-
tests over it, but that is far from being necessarily the case. (The discovery of a 
lost gospel detailing an affair between Jesus and Mary Magdalene, for example, 
would certainly enter into struggles over the ownership of Christianity, with its 
difficulties over sexuality, today.)
Nevertheless, Gellner is correct that a concept’s or term’s status as essen-
tially contested is a hostage to the past, albeit not necessarily the distant past. 
That is because an essentially contested term is distinguished from a con-
fusedly contested one precisely by the existence of something that is being 
contested over, and what is being contested over, on my interpretation, is an 
actual piece of history. People have criticized Putnam’s approach to natural 
kind terms because it allegedly makes the meanings of such terms hostage to 
the world and its nature beyond the confines of the knowledge and speech pat-
terns of the people using the terms. “Cut the pie anyway you like,” says Putnam, 
“‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head”.25 Nor, we may add, are they necessarily in 
24 In similar spirit, Ingram, “Open Concepts and Contested Concepts’, 42, dismisses 
condition VI very quickly because, he says, for a concept like work of art, “it would 
surely be impossible to postulate an original exemplar”. It would, of course, be absurd to 
postulate the original work of art. But Gallie requires no such thing, as his discussion of 
the very case of art makes clear. (Incidentally, part of Ingram’s confusion is generated by 
taking “work of art” as the primary formulation of the contested concept or term; what is 
really the primary formulation is “art.” A work of art is a work produced as part of a certain 
tradition.)
25 Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, 227.
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the present. People may use essentially contested terms without any, or much, 
knowledge of the histories of the traditions involved just as someone may 
correctly use the term “water” without knowing anything about its chemical 
nature. In the case of essentially contested terms, people may even engage in 
the contests that are waged, incorrectly thinking that they are arguments over 
definition rather than contests to appropriate history. But none of this means 
that understanding the ways such terms work does not require adverting to 
history or the world beyond the ken of a term’s current users. In any case, to 
reject genetic accounts of natural kind and essentially contested terms simply 
because they commit the so-called genetic fallacy is simply to refuse to engage 
with the theories being advanced.
The second objection raised against Gallie’s theory that I would like to dis-
cuss is this. Some commentators have supposed that the expression “essen-
tially contested concept” means a concept such that there is a contest about 
it.26 But a concept is often, reasonably enough, taken as something individu-
ated by its (conceptual) content. Adopting both these assumptions has two 
negative consequences. First, it encourages the assimilation of Gallie’s theory 
of essentially contested concepts to other theoretical positions, such as Rawls’s 
distinction between concepts and conceptions, to which it bears a superficial 
but misleading resemblance. (It is supposed that the concept is accepted by 
the parties to a contest, and their contest takes the form of their having dif-
ferent conceptions associated with that concept.)27 But secondly, and more 
pointedly, the two assumptions appear to generate a kind of dilemma faced 
by one who posits the existence of essentially contested concepts. On the one 
hand, if the concept that is contested is identified by its content, then the exis-
tence of genuine disagreement over something, rather than mere miscom-
munication, implies the existence of some core agreement about conceptual 
content. Whatever is contested is therefore in some sense peripheral, and not 
essential to the concept itself. On the other hand, if there is no agreement over 
the concept itself, then the contest cannot be real since there is no single thing 
being fought over.
This dilemma is resolved, independently but harmoniously, by two aspects 
of my interpretation. First, taking Gallie’s theory as a semantic theory, a theory 
about the meanings of certain kinds of words, rather than as a theory about 
26 The supposition is explicit in Gray, “On the Contestability of Social and Political 
Concepts,” 344, and Swanton, “On the ‘Essential Contestedness’ of Political Concepts”, 811 
and passim, but is implicit in, I think, all discussions of the subject I have encountered. 
Swanton (816ff.) has a good discussion of this whole line of objection.
27 See Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 154, fn. 12.
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certain kinds of concepts, removes the temptation to suppose there must be 
some conceptual content over which the contesting parties agree in order 
for there to be something they are disagreeing about. But perhaps a deeper 
response to the dilemma is this. Essentially contested concepts (even suppos-
ing we do not switch to talk of terms) are not concepts about which there is a 
contest; rather they are concepts of contested things.28 What makes the con-
test real rather than illusory is not that both parties agree over some conceptual 
content; it is that they are arguing over a common exemplar, a stage of a tradi-
tion on my view, and the relations of other things to that exemplar.29 The con-
test is over history and its inheritance and not over concepts. It can sometimes 
appear as if the contest is over something conceptual, or definitional, because 
there is a tendency to mistake historical concrete realities, like Christianity, for 
ideas and so a disagreement about what now is real Christianity can look as if 
it is a disagreement about the real definition of the idea of Christianity. But this 
is, as I say, a misprision of the real disagreement.30
4 The Range of Essentially Contested Concepts
In this final section, I address the extension of the concept of an essentially 
contested concept or term. I have interpreted the concept in such a way as 
to apply to terms that refer to historical entities. This way of putting things 
works well for some of Gallie’s examples but not for others. And it does not 
28 And in fact, Gallie is careful to talk about contests over the proper use, application, or 
function of concepts, not over their meanings or definitions.
29 Swanton, in her treatment of the dilemma, correctly sees that it is the exemplar that 
provides the way out, but she makes two mistakes in her presentation of this solution. 
First, she thinks that taking the exemplar as the unifying factor in a contest does violence 
to the idea of essentially contested concepts. On the contrary, I believe it does justice to 
Gallie, and violence only to a tradition of misinterpretation of his view. Secondly, she 
takes the exemplar to be endoxa, things agreed on by the wise or the many and expressed 
in terms of the essentially contested concept at issue. Since a tradition, of course, is partly 
constituted by the things people in and out of the tradition say, she is close but not quite 
on target with this suggestion.
30 Gellner charges that Gallie’s commitment to the importance of the exemplar “betray[s] 
his own idea: he talks as if, behind each ‘essentially contested concept’, there was, 
hidden away in some Platonic heaven, a non-contested, unambiguously defined and 
fully determinate concept or exemplar” (97, my emphasis). The disjunction “concept or 
exemplar” is, it should now be evident, a conflation that ends up standing Gallie’s actual 
view entirely on its head.
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seem to include a large range of cases that have generally been assumed to be 
examples of essentially contested concepts. Some comment is needed about 
what is going on here.
First, then, Gallie’s own examples.31 The two most fully worked out cases 
he discusses are Christianity and art. I have already spoken extensively about 
Christianity. Regarding art, I think Gallie is right that disputes about what is art 
are disputes about the continuation and centre of gravity of an historical tradi-
tion and his views on this should be seen in the light of the work of aestheti-
cians like Arthur Danto (1964) and Jerrold Levinson (1979), the latter of whom, 
especially, develops a theory of the nature of art that makes perfect sense of 
Gallie’s position on it.32 Gallie also discusses two further ‘live’ examples: social 
justice and democracy. Social justice, he argues, is not a good example of an 
essentially contested concept. This judgment is significant when we remem-
ber that it is precisely the concept of social justice, and others like it, that 
are so often uncritically taken as examples of essentially contested concepts. 
Regarding democracy, as a political idea, it would not be an example of an 
historical entity and hence the term “democracy” would not function in the 
way I have suggested terms in his target class do. But Gallie’s inconsistent use 
of capitalization (he mostly writes “Democracy”) suggests that he is also think-
ing of an historical movement or tradition, something analogous to Liberalism 
or Conservatism, reference to which would function in the way I have tried to 
capture in terms of an exemplar and an I-relation.
Without discussing them, Gallie also mentions a host of other possible 
examples of his target class. I cannot deal with them all, but two general obser-
vations are in order. Some of these other cases are of things that are in some 
sense dependent on more general things that are clear instances of the tar-
get class, such as coloration and dogma, dependent on art and Christianity 
respectively. Such things may or may not be historical entities in their own 
right, but even if they are not, we can expect the terms to function in a way 
that is dependent on the historical nature of the entity with which they are 
connected and hence for them to exhibit signs of the kinds of contest Gallie 
is concerned with. Conversely, some of the examples are at a higher level 
of generality than his paradigm cases, for example, religion and law. Here, 
I think, Gallie is wrong to see them as examples of the phenomenon he is really 
31 I will not discuss his example concerning championship in an invented game since it 
would require too much space to make sense of.
32 Arthur Danto, “The Artworld”,  Journal of Philosophy, 61 (1960), 571–84 and Jerrold 
Levinson, “Defining Art Historically”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 19 (1979), 232–50.
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interested in.33 Religions or bodies of law are historical entities but the kinds 
they form, religion and law, need not be, and need not be subject to the kinds of 
contests Gallie identifies. Arguments over whether, say, Buddhism or Marxism 
are religions are more like the kinds of arguments to be settled by stipulation 
than arguments over who is the heir to the tradition of Christ and the Bible.
Those who have ostensibly been most responsive to Gallie’s work have taken 
the field of essentially contested concepts to be occupied principally by such 
things as social justice, freedom, power, and so on. In most of these cases, I 
believe that the authors are simply wrong to think of these as examples of 
Gallie’s phenomenon, and it is striking, as I have noted above, that such treat-
ments usually involve a more or less explicit rejection of Gallie’s view about 
the importance of an exemplar in understanding essentially contested con-
cepts. The authors concerned with these concepts may be right to take them 
as examples of concepts that are not to be understood simply by supplying 
necessary and sufficient conditions. But there is no reason to think that there 
is only one kind of concept that cannot be understood this way and hence that 
if Gallie is talking about concepts that cannot be understood in terms of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions, then all concepts that cannot be so understood 
must be of the kind Gallie was interested in. The very interesting ways in which 
concepts like freedom or power function, and the kinds of disputes to which 
they give rise, certainly deserve to be studied. It may even be that they behave 
in a way that would make the phrase “essentially contested concepts” an apt 
name for them. But Gallie tells us (more or less) what he means by that expres-
sion, and there is nothing to be gained by ignoring the differences between 
those other concepts and what Gallie is actually focused on.34
33 An indication that Gallie may be confused here is provided by the fact that he says he is 
going to discuss the case of religion, but immediately switches to discussing Christianity 
instead.
34 Many thanks, for helpful discussion of earlier drafts of this paper, to Brad Cokelet, 
Giovanna Pompele, Michael Slote, Clark Wolf, a referee for this journal, and audiences 
at the Florida Philosophical Association and at the graduate research seminar in the 
philosophy department at the University of Haifa.
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